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INTRODUCTION 
A security is a fungible, negotiable financial instrument that represents some 
type of financial value. Security markets provide a way for investors to channel their 
savings as creditors to debtors. The persons involved are a) the creditor b) the 
debtor and c) financial intermediaries. It would be possibly useful to very briefly give 
a general picture of how securities markets work. 
The lenders include the private sector (individuals, corporations, institutions 
not affiliated with governments) and the public sector investors (public owned 
corporations/ institutions and governments through exchequer). They use willingly 
their savings which are profits coming from other activities, to purchase a claim in 
future earnings. They are also called creditors and investors. 
The borrowers are mainly corporate entities and governments. Through 
borrowing they get an opportunity to raise capital for projects that require huge 
financing. The corporate borrowers borrow through equity and bond debt 
instruments while governments borrow only through bonds. Borrowers are also 
called debtors and issuers.  
The financial intermediaries connect the creditors and the debtors. They 
mainly include banks, brokers and hedge funds. Their main role is double. First they 
channel the money needed from the creditor to the debtor. Second they analyze and 
evaluate risks involved in investing in the debtor’s securities and advise creditors on 
the suitability of securities instruments offered by borrowers.  
From the aforementioned it can be easily deducted that the possession of 
confidential information concerning the issuer is a crucial advantage for an investor. 
It can contribute to gaining huge profits or avoiding huge losses. Furthermore 
securities markets play vital role regarding the flow of capitals. Through this flow of 
capitals, money is found for governments to fulfill their policies and corporations to 
finance projects, which offer workplaces for millions of people worldwide. Any kind 
of abuse regarding this market, would harm its effectiveness and reduce investors’ 
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confidence. This could subsequently have major negative results worldwide. For this 
reason market abuse which consists of insider dealing and market manipulation is 
worldwide prohibited. The goal of this dissertation is to focus on the main subjects 
concerning EU legislation on Market Abuse.  
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF EU LEGISLATION 
A. HARMONIZATION BASED ON E.C.J. CASE LAW APPROACH 
Until the mid 1980s there was no legislation in E.U. level concerning securities 
market. The regulation of these markets was left to for national E.U. Member States’ 
legislators. European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisprudence granted for the 
harmonization of these legislations. The main disadvantages of this tactic were 
mainly the following ones: 
a. The market integration and approximation of national laws effected through 
the Court’s case law developed at a slow pace1. 
b. The coherence of this kind of integration was lesser than it would have been, 
if it had been evolved through harmonization of legislation2. 
c. The “general good” criterion3  evolved by the ECJ set obstacles to the 
establishment of a single E.U. market, concerning also financial services4. The 
general good included imperative public interests like protection of 
consumers, reasons of political and ethical nature founded on social order etc, 
which had been seen as reasonable and justified restrictions to the freedom 
to provide services5.  
One indicative example of the obstacles set to financial services by ECJ 
jurisprudence is the decision ECJ 24.10.1978 (C-15/78) known also as Koestler case6.  
This concerned the application of a German rule, which voided stock exchange 
futures as wagering agreements, to a series of stock exchange speculative 
transactions undertaken by a French bank on behalf of a German national. The 
questions set to ECJ concerned, whether articles 59 and 60 EEC Treaty excluded the 
                                                          
1 See Avgouleas Emilios, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse, A Legal and 
Economic Analysis, Oxford University Press, 2005, Chapter 6, p. 3  
2 See ibid. 
3 Imperative public interests like protection of consumers, social order had been seen as 
reasonable and justified restrictions to freedom  
4 See ibid. 
5  See ECJ  10.05.1995,Court Decision, C-384/93, available at the official EU website 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61993J0384:EN:HTML 
6 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61978J0015:EN:HTML 
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objection set by German law. Although French law regarded futures contracts as a 
legal investment activity, and the agreement had been concluded in France, the ECJ 
decided that the contract was void, because the German rule applied in a non-
discriminatory manner7. In its view, non-discriminatory barriers to cross-border 
provision of services could be justified ‘for reasons founded on the social order’8, 
which mainly had an ethical or political nature.  
The aforementioned difficulties, led to the White Paper of the Delors 
Commission on the internal market. Its objectives concerning the financial services’ 
sector were the complete liberalization of capital movements, the integration of 
national markets for financial services and the establishment of a common 
regulatory structure for financial institutions. Additionally a key means to all these, 
was the removal of legislative national restrictions of Member States which 
prevented market integrity. The White Paper was adopted by the Council of 
Ministers and constituted the basis for the Single European Act 1986 (SEA), an 
amendment of the Treaty of Rome. 
B. THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT 1986 (SEA) 
SEA introduced a series of Directives in its attempt to achieve its goals e.g. the 
first Directive concerning insider dealing (89/592/EEC), as well as the Public Offer 
Prospectus Directives (80/390/EEC and 89/298/EEC) and further regulatory legal 
texts such as the Major Shareholders Directive etc. The main principles of these 
Directives were minimum harmonization, mutual recognition, home country control 
and single passport.  
The most important objective of the aforementioned body of legislation, was the 
integration of the internal market for banking and financial services through the 
liberalization of capital flows and the creation of a harmonized (on the basis of 
minimum standards) regulatory framework, which would ensure that the ‘single 
passport’ and home country control principles operated without significant difficulty. 
Several other expressed objectives of the relevant legislation were the elimination of 
                                                          
7 See Thoughts 4 and 6 
8 See Thought 5 
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distortions of competition in the internal market between investment firms and 
credit institutions and the improvement of national investor protection regimes. 
Some of these goals were achieved up to a certain degree e.g. Council Directive 
89/592/EEC prohibited insider dealing and settled issues concerning disclosure 
documents and public offer of securities. On the other hand there were also several 
difficulties concerning mainly the fact that harmonization legislation did not extend 
up to specific vital areas of European market. This had as a result that market 
integration continued to move at slow pace and important differences could be 
observed throughout Europe e.g. regarding the manner financial services contracts 
were formed or the manner regulators understood and interpreted the harmonized 
legislation.  
These difficulties led to the next stage which was the adoption of Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP). 
C. THE ADOPTION OF FSAP  
The first steps were two Communications issued by the Commission. The first 
one issued in 1998, concerned building a framework for action on financial services. 
The second one issued in May 1999 concerned the implementation of the FSAP. In 
these Communications, the Commission recognized the deficiencies of the existing 
EC financial market legislation in two areas: The first one concerned the goal of 
market integration and the second one the lack of effectiveness concerning the 
regulatory challenges that an integrated market and modern market developments 
brought about, e.g. regarding cross-border market abuse and conflict of laws. These 
deficiencies clearly illustrated the goals of the Commission. On the one hand areas 
which had not been regulated had to be regulated and on the other hand the already 
existing regulations had to be further reformed so that harmonization legislation 
would be achieved in a higher degree.           
D. THE FOUR LEVEL APPROACH  
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In 2000 the Council set up the so-called Committee of the Wise Men. Its 
chairman was Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy9, this is the reason why the process 
suggested by this Committee is often called the “Lamfalussy process”. The purpose 
of this Committee was to identify and recommend the most efficient and timely 
(‘fast-track’) procedure to debate and enact financial markets legislation. The 
recommendations of the Committee of the Wise Men had also to be accepted by the 
European Parliament. The Committee published its Final Report in February 2001. 
This Report suggested a four level approach and the constitution of two 
committees10. The final outcome was that Stockholm European Council of March 
2001 endorsed the final report of the Committee of the Wise Men. The European 
Parliament agreed to this new approach in a Resolution adopted on 5 February 2002, 
adding, however, a number of conditions that would widen Parliament’s role in the 
new procedure. The Commission adopted, in the meanwhile, two Decisions 
establishing the European Securities Committee (ESC)11, and the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR).  
In the rest of this unit there will be a brief description of the two committees 
and the four levels.   
Da. The Two Committees 
The first Committee is called the European Security Committee (ESC). It has 
been established with the Commission Decision of the 6th of June 2001. Its role is to 
advise the Commission on policy issues as well as on draft legislative proposals the 
Commission might adopt in the field of securities (Article 2). It is composed of high 
level representatives of Member States and is chaired by a representative of the 
Commission (Article 3).  
                                                          
9 See Charter of CESR http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/01_003.pdf 
10For the four-level approach see also Van Empel M., (2008), Financial Services in Europe: 
An Introductory Overview, Austin, Boston, Chicago, New York, The Netherlands: Wolters 
Kluwers Law & Businesss  p. 115 
11 See http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:191:0045:0046:EN:PDF 
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The Summary Records uploaded refer to totally 76 meetings, held from 2003 
to 2011 and varied from four to ten per year12. Specific issues which had been 
discussed during these meeting were for example in the 26th Meeting (15.12.2004) 
that the objective regarding the implementation of legislative measures adopted in 
the context of the FSAP should mainly focus on two directions; to enforce the 
legislation that has been put in place and to check whether the system could 
economically function. In the 72nd Meeting13 (9.11.2010), what has been discussed 
concerning the Securities Law Directive, was the relationship between the draft 
legislation and the Convention of The Hague. 
The second Committee is called Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR). It has been established with the 2001/1501/EC Commission 
Decision of the 6th of June 200114. Its role is to advise the Commission, either at the 
Commission's request, within a time limit which the Commission may lay down 
according to the urgency of the matter, or on the Committee's own initiative, in 
particular for the preparation of draft implementing measures in the field of 
securities (Article 2). It is composed of high-level representatives from the national 
public authorities competent in the field of securities (Article 3). Each Member State 
designates a high-level representative from its competent authority to participate in 
the meetings of the Committee.  
The Committee’s tasks as laid out in its charter are the following ones:  
a. It advises the European Commission on securities policy issues either at the 
European Commission’s request, within a time-limit which the Commission 
may lay down according to the urgency of the matter, or on its own initiative 
(Article 4.1 of its Charter)15. 
                                                          
12 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/esc/index_en.htm 
13 See  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/esc/meetings/2010-11-09-
report_en.pdf 
14 http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/EstablishCESR_2001_527.pdf 
15 See http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/01_003.pdf 
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b. It responds within such time limits to the mandates given by the European 
Commission in respect of the preparation of implementing measures (Article 
4.2 of its Charter)16. 
c. It fosters and reviews common and uniform day to day implementation and 
application of Community legislation. Furthermore it issues guidelines, 
recommendations and standards that the members introduce in their 
regulatory practices on a voluntary basis. Finally it also undertakes reviews of 
regulatory practices within the single market (Article 4.3 of its Charter)17. 
d. It develops effective operational network mechanisms to enhance day-to-day 
consistent supervision and enforcement of the Single Market for financial 
services (Article 4.4 of its Charter)18. 
e. It observes and assesses the evolution of financial markets and the global 
tendencies in securities regulation and their impact on the regulation of the 
Single Market for financial services (Article 4.5 of its Charter)19. 
It has issued three set of guidelines so far. The first one, issued in 2005, 
concerned market manipulation and contained examples of practices CESR Members 
considered as market manipulation20. The second one, issued in 2007, concerned 
insider dealing and specifically what constitutes inside information, reasons to delay 
the publication of inside information etc21.  The third one, issued in 2009, concerned 
the notion of insider, suspicious transactions, stabilization and buy pack reports and 
the notion of inside information22.    
 
                                                          
16 See ibid. 
17 See ibid 
18 See ibid 
19 See ibid 
20 See Barnes Paul supra note 3, and Market Abuse Directive, Level 3 – first set of CESR 
guidance and information on the common operation of the Directive, Ref: CESR/04-505b 
from http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/04_505b.pdf 
21 See Market Abuse Directive Level 3 – second set of CESR guidance and information on the 
common operation of the Directive to the market, 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/06_562b.pdf 
22 See Level 3 – third set of CESR guidance and information on the common operation of the 
Directive, Ref: CESR/09-219, http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/09_219.pdf 
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Db. The Four Levels  
The First Level concerned primary legislation e.g. Market Abuse Directive 
2003/6/EC. More specifically, EC Commission, the Council and the European 
Parliament should produce only general principle framework directives, which would 
constitute First Level legislation. These directives should focus on the core political 
principles of relevant legislation. The structure of the procedure would be the 
following one. The Commission would first make a proposal concerning one relevant 
subject.  Afterwards, Council and the European Parliament acting on this proposal 
would agree on the key political direction and orientation for each of these subjects. 
  The Second Level concerned technical implementing measures such as the 
Commission Directives 2003/124/EC on definition and public disclosure of inside 
information and the definition of market manipulation and 2003/125/EC on the fair 
presentation of investment recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of 
interest. In this procedure the two committees would also be involved. More 
specifically, these Directives would be adopted by the Commission with the 
assistance of the ESC, following consultation with the CESR. The Committee of the 
Wise Men adopted the Article 202 of the Treaty procedure for the production of 
Level 2 rules. This meant that the European Parliament would be excluded from the 
drafting but not the consultation process.   
The Third Level concerned the adoption of non-binding guidelines and 
common standards by the Wise Men Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR).  
The Fourth Level concerned the monitoring of the implementation of all this 
legislative effort in Member States level. The final stage in the new regulatory 
approach, Level 4, is concerned with consistent application of the adopted rules and 
enforcement. The Commission checks Member State compliance with EU legislation 
and it may take legal action against Member States suspected of breach of Union 
Law23. 
                                                          
23  See Applications Commission v. Luxembourg  C-128/06, C-151/06 and C-236/06 
concerning approximation of laws www.infocuria.com 
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E. THE REGULATION AND DIRECTIVE PROPOSAL24 
On 28.06.2010 the Commission services launched a public consultation on 
the review of the Market Abuse Directive. Its objective was to consult financial 
market participants, governments, competent authorities and other stakeholders on 
the modifications to the Market Abuse Directive that the Commission is considering 
for its forthcoming legislative proposal. On 20.10.2011 Commission adopted 
proposals for a Regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation (market 
abuse), and for a Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market 
manipulation25. On 25.07.2012 Commission adopted amended proposals for a 
Regulation and for a Directive to prohibit and criminalise manipulation of 
benchmarks. On 10.09.2013 the European Parliament endorsed the political 
agreement on new European rules for market abuse. 
The main goal of this Regulation is to update and strengthen the existing legal 
framework and to ensure market integrity and investor protection provided by the 
Market Abuse Directive. The new framework aims to make sure that regulation 
follows market developments and to help make the fight against market abuse 
across commodity and related derivative markets more effective. The choice of 
Regulation shows that maximum harmonization is the main intention of the 
Commission.  
Ea. The Reasons 
The MAD is based on the concept of prohibiting insider dealing or market 
manipulation in financial instruments which are admitted to trading on a regulated 
market. However, since the adoption of MiFID, financial instruments have been 
increasingly traded on multilateral trading facilities (MTFs), on other types of 
organised trading facilities (OTFs), such as swap execution facilities or broker 
crossing systems, or only traded OTC. These new trading venues and facilities have 
provided more competition to existing regulated markets, gaining an increased share 
                                                          
24 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-774_en.htm 
25 See  European Commission Press Release IP 11/12/17 available at  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1217_en.htm 
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of liquidity and attracting a broader range of investors. Besides these, they also 
established a new market reality which created new regulatory needs since it made 
clear there were several gaps regarding the already existing legal framework. These 
gaps and problems were mainly the following ones: 
  There were gaps in regulation of new markets, platforms and over-the-counter 
(OTC) trading in financial instruments;26 
 There were gaps in regulation of commodities and commodity derivatives; 
 regulators could not effectively enforce the MAD;27 
 There was lack of legal certainty, which undermined the effectiveness of the   
        MAD;28 
 There were administrative burdens, especially for small and medium-sized 
companies (SMEs)29 
The main changes which created a new market reality refer mainly-as 
mentioned above- to financial instruments which are traded on organized platforms 
and over the counter (OTC) and the adaption of new technology e.g. High Frequency 
Trading (HFT).  Additionally, gaps concerning regulatory framework were made clear 
through the LIBOR scandal. Consequently it may be of use to briefly describe the 
mechanics of OTC, HFT and MTFs in order to more clearly illustrate what the 
Regulation aims to settle. Additionally, for the same reason, the LIBOR scandal is also 
briefly described. 
i. OTC Markets 
There are two main types of derivative markets. The first one is the Exchange 
based Market, the second one is the OTC market. Their main difference is that the 
first one involves an extra party, which is called “Exchange”. This one is run like a 
business and draws up or designs the standard contracts. In other words the terms 
                                                          
26 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-774_en.htm 
27 See ibid 
28 See ibid 
29 See ibid 
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of these contracts are fixed and the only thing that varies is the price. Furthermore 
Exchange administers the process of trading (system of clearing and margining). 
 On the other hand, in the second type (OTC market), derivatives are traded 
directly between counterparties without the infrastructure of the exchange. This lack 
of infrastructure mainly results in the parties’ tendency to develop their own risk 
control policies. These policies are mainly the provision of collateral, the application 
of a system of margin and the extensive documentation used30 (ISDA Master 
Agreements, ICOM Master Agreement, IFE Master Agreement etc). The most 
important agreements used internationally in such contracts are the ISDA Master 
Agreements (2002)31. In other words in OTC market parties rely exclusively on each 
other. 
As far as the provision of collateral as a risk control policy is concerned the 
following figure32 is indicative of the frequency of its use.  
Percent of Trades 
All OTC 
Derivatives 
Fixed 
Income 
Derivatives 
Credit 
Derivatives 
FX 
Derivatives 
Equity 
Derivatives 
Precious 
and Base 
Metals 
Derivatives 
Energy and 
other 
Commodity 
Derivatives 
78% 84% 97% 63% 68% 63% 62% 
ii. MFT 
An MFT is under Article 4 (1) (15) MiFID a multilateral system, operated by an 
investment firm or a market operator, which brings together multiple third party 
buying and selling interests in financial instruments, in accordance with non 
discretionary rules, in a way that results in a contract. Specific issues concerning this 
system are settled in MAR.  
                                                          
30 See Castagnino John-Peter, Derivatives The Key Principles, 3rd Edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p. 185 
31 See Keijser Thomas Financial Collateral Arrangements, Kluwer 2006, p. 24  
32 See ISDA, Market Review of OTC Derivative Bilateral Collateralization Practices , Release 
2.0., 1st of March 2010,p.7 available at http://www.isda.org/c_and_a/pdf/Collateral-Market-
Review.pdf 
19 
 
It offers different types of markets which are: a) continuous auction order 
book trading system, which continuously and automatically matches sell orders and 
buy orders with no human intervention, b) a quote driven trading system, under 
which transactions are concluded on the basis of firm quotes that are continuously 
made available by market makers c) a periodic auction trading system, which 
periodically and automatically matches sell orders and buy orders with no human 
intervention.  
iii. HFT 
HFT is one of the key developments stemming from technological advances. 
Its history goes back to as early as 2000 and is part of a long trend toward increasing 
trading automation33. There are several factors which have contributed to the 
emergence of HFT. Some of these are the evolution of technology and low latency 
access to the market. Furthermore extensive reforms to the regulatory framework in 
major financial markets, which aimed at promoting competition in trading services, 
have also played an important role. For example in EU the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID), which came into force in November 2007, aimed to 
foster competition. In order to achieve that, it abolished the concentration rule and 
allowed the emergence of alternatives to traditional stock exchanges.  
In the last few years HFTs has become a quantitatively significant feature of 
modern financial markets. It is indicative that between 2004 and 2010, high-
frequency trading increased from about 13% of all foreign-exchange flows to 30%34. 
By 2011, high-frequency trading had been used for about 60 % of the 7 billion shares 
that had changed hands daily on United States stock markets, and for about 35% to 
40% percent of European equities trading volume35.  
HFT and algorithmic trading constitute “the black box trading”. High-
frequency trading is trading that uses computerized platforms to execute a large 
                                                          
33See OICV-IOSCO  Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, Regulatory Issues Raised by the Impact of Technological Changes on Market 
Integrity and Efficiency Consultation Report, July 2011, p.19 available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD354.pdf 
34 See ibid 
35 See ibid 
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number of trades at super speeds (measured in seconds and milliseconds)36. It is 
believed that under normal circumstances, high-frequency trading can have a 
positive impact in markets since it increases liquidity and decreases volatility in the 
short term by enhancing trade volume and execution speeds.  
On the other hand, during periods of high uncertainty, like today, high-
frequency trading can exacerbate volatility and harm liquidity by removing 
significant trading positions from the markets at warp speeds37. One indicative 
example is the famous so called Flash Crash of May 6, 2010. On this day, prices of 
US-based equities products went up and down in a very short time influencing over 
20,000 trades across more than 300 securities which were executed at prices more 
than 60% away from their values just moments before38. HFTs have not caused this 
crash but it is strongly believed that their responses to pressure of selling have 
exacerbated market volatility39. 
iv. The LIBOR Scandal 
 The LIBOR scandal concerned manipulation of benchmarks and proved that 
there were several gaps concerning EU legislation on securities markets. It may be of 
use to first briefly describe the function of benchmarks in order to understand the 
possible negative impact it may have on the function of markets.  
A benchmark is a commercial index or published figure which is calculated by 
a specific formula to the value of one or more underlying assets (e.g. estimated 
prices, interest rates etc). These underlying assets or prices used in benchmarks can 
also include equities (e.g. FTSE 100 index), bonds, interest rates (LIBOR or EURIBOR), 
                                                          
36 Lin Tom C.W., The New Investor. 60 UCLA Law Review 678 (2013), p. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2227498, OICV-IOSCO Technical 
Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, Regulatory Issues 
Raised by the Impact of Technological Changes on Market Integrity and Efficiency 
Consultation Report  
37 See ibid supra note 33  
38 See Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, 
Regulatory Issues Raised by the Impact of Technological Changes on Market Integrity and 
Efficiency Consultation Report, p.11 
39 See Kirilenko Adrei/Kyle S. Albert/ Mehrdad Samadi/ Tugkan Tuzun The Flash Crash: The 
Impact of High Frequency Trading on an Electronic Market, May 26 2011, available to 
download at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1686004 
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commodities (e.g. agricultural products), metal and oil. The price of financial 
instruments (e.g. interest rate swaps, mortgages, loans and credit cards) is related to 
such benchmarks.  
Libor is a benchmark interest rate based on the rates at which banks lend 
unsecured funds to each other on the London interbank market, and is published 
daily by the British Bankers' Association (BBA)40. This means that global banks submit 
daily their borrowing costs to the Thomson Reuters data collection service. The 
calculation agent throws out the highest and lowest 25 percent of submissions and 
then averages the remaining rates to determine Libor. Calculated for fifteen 
different maturities and ten different currencies, Libor is considered the most critical 
global benchmark for short-term interest rates. Eighteen banks submit rates for the 
U.S. dollar Libor. Consequently any manipulation of benchmarks may influence the 
price of financial instruments and have a serious (negative) impact on market 
confidence since it could lead to significant losses to investors and distort the real 
economy. This is so because large sums of money of financial instruments could be 
(and here in particular have been) priced at wrong rates41.   
     Investigations concerning this scandal began in March 2011. They referred 
to possible such manipulations concerning EURIBOR and LIBOR benchmarks for 
interbanking lending rates, by a number of banks. It turned out there were several 
false submissions of banks' estimated interbank lending rates.  
The Commission took this into account and presented on 25th July 2012 its 
Amendments to Proposals for Market Abuse Regulation and the Directive concerning 
Criminal Sanctions of Market Abuse in order to make clear that they deal with issues 
arising from the LIBOR scandal and ensures the prohibition of such tactics. 
Furthermore in order to strengthen the prohibition of such manipulations,   market 
                                                          
40 See Alessi Christopher and  Mohammed Aly Sergie, Understanding the LIBOR Scandal at 
UK Council on Foreign Relations website, http://www.cfr.org/united-
kingdom/understanding-libor-scandal/p28729 
41 See ibid and European Commission Amendments to proposed Market Abuse legislation to 
fight rate fixing – frequently asked questions http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
12-595_en.htm?locale=fr 
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abuse occurring across both commodity and related derivative markets will be 
prohibited, and cooperation between financial and commodity regulators will be 
reinforced.  
Moreover supervisors will have access to the information they need to detect 
and sanction market abuse. Since the sanctions currently available to supervisors 
often lack a deterrent effect, sanctions will be tougher and more harmonised. 
Possible criminal sanctions are the subject of a separate but complementary 
proposal on which it is hoped that negotiations between the European Parliament 
and the Council on a political agreement could conclude by the end of this year42. 
Eb. Objectives of the new Regulation 
The objectives of the Regulation are clearly illustrated by the reasons which 
led to it. It is clear that they are the mirror of the needs the Regulation has to cover 
and the problem it has to deal with. For the adequacy of this paper they are briefly 
presented below. 
iv. Keeping pace with market developments 
The first objective is to keep pace with market developments. The regulatory 
framework provided by the original Market Abuse Directive has been outpaced by 
the growth of new trading platforms, OTC trading and new technology such as high 
frequency trading (HFT). The new Regulation extends the scope of existing EU 
legislation to financial instruments only traded on multilateral trading facilities 
(MTFs), other organised trading facilities (OTFs) and when traded OTC so that trading 
on all platforms and of all financial instruments which can impact them will now be 
covered by market abuse legislation.  
It also provides an indicative list of HFT strategies which shall be considered 
as market manipulation, such as placing orders which has the effect of disrupting or 
delaying the functioning of a trading system ("quote stuffing"). Commodity markets 
have become increasingly global and interconnected with derivative markets, 
                                                          
42 See IP/11/1218 
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leading to new possibilities for cross-border and cross-market abuse. The scope of 
the legislation is therefore extended to market abuse occurring across both 
commodity and related derivative markets. 
v. Reinforcing regulators' investigative and sanctioning powers  
The second objective is to reinforce regulators' investigative and sanctioning 
powers. Regarding this objective, the new Regulation aims to extend the current 
reporting of suspicious transactions also to the direction of suspicious unexecuted 
orders and suspicious OTC transactions. In order to achieve this, the following 
measures will be taken.   
First, everyone professionally involved in executing transactions will have to 
have systems in place to detect suspicious transactions. Second the Regulation 
grants supervisory powers to regulators to investigate possible cases of market 
abuse, subject to adequate and effective safeguards. Third, it also requires Member 
States to provide for mechanisms for the reporting of actual or potential breaches of 
the provisions of this Regulation to competent authorities (whistleblowing). Fourth, 
it also includes attempted market abuse within the prohibition scope, making it 
possible for regulators to impose a sanction in cases where someone tries to insider 
deal or manipulate the market. 
Common principles are proposed, notably the maximum fine should not be 
less than three times any such profit. In parallel, a proposal for a Directive on 
criminal sanctions for market abuse requires Member States to introduce criminal 
sanctions for the offences of insider dealing and market manipulation where these 
are committed intentionally43. Trilogue negotiations on the Directive are expected to 
commence in the second half of this year.  
vi. Reducing administrative burdens on SME issuers  
                                                          
43  See European Commission Press Release IP 11/1218 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-11-1218_en.htm?locale=en 
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The third objective is to reduce administrative burdens on SME issuers. The 
disclosure requirements for issuers on SME markets will be adapted to their needs, 
and issuers on such markets will be subject to tailored rules for the requirement to 
draw up lists of insiders.  
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II. THE NECESSITY OF INSIDER TRADING/DEALING PROHIBITION AND 
THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES 
A. THE NECESSITY OF INSIDER TRADING/DEALING PROHIBITION 
The first fundamental question which must be answered is whether insider 
trading must be prohibited. It is true that nowadays insider dealing is considered as 
illegal in most of the states worldwide. On the other hand, a lot of economic 
research has attempted to prove that there is nothing unfair about it. It would be 
therefore interesting to revisit this debate by presenting the main arguments of each 
side. 
Aa. The opinion against the prohibition44 
The first argument is that insider dealing is one of the most effective ways to 
award the agents e.g. corporate executives for their contribution to the growth of 
the company and consequently the increase of the shareholders’ (principals’) profits. 
The second argument runs as follows; one of the fundaments of EU and US 
securities law legislation is the perception that the quicker price-sensitive 
information is disclosed the better informed the investors are. The better informed 
the investors are, the more sensible their investments are, which consequently leads 
to accurate prices of the shares45, efficient allocations of capitals and high market 
liquidity. On the other hand there are few cases, in which disclosure can be 
legitimately delayed according to Article 6 (2) MAD, in favor of the preservation of 
current business structures. These exceptional cases are laid out in Article 3 
Commission Directive 2003/124/EC (second level of “Lamfalussy process”46) e.g. 
legitimate transactions of market-makers or takeover law. This argument suggests 
                                                          
44 See Harris M. Daniel/ Herzel Leo, Do we need insider trading laws?, Company Lawyer, 
1989 , West Law UK, Lagenbucher Katja, The “use or possession” debate revisited -Spector 
Photo Group and Insider trading in Europe, Capital Markets Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4 p.462-
465, Manne Henry, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, Free Press, New York, 1966 
45 See Lagenbucher Katja, The “use or possession” debate revisited, p.463, Sifuna Anazett 
Pacy, Disclose or abstain: The prohibition of insider trading on trial. Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation, 2012,p.3 both just presenting the arguments and not 
supporting them   
46 See above Unit Db. 
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that in such cases, the inside information which is legitimately kept secret by the 
issuer is infused to the market through insider trading/dealing. In this manner the 
aforementioned fundamental targets of liquidity, efficient allocations of capitals etc 
are still achieved without delay.           
There is also one example concerning the effect of insider trading/dealing 
prohibition on market efficiency which is thought to support the opinion against the 
prohibition. It has to do with what happened in Japan. Marc Ramseyer47 in a study of 
insider trading/dealing analyses the impact 1988 amendments to Japanese Securities 
Law concerning civil and criminal liability on insider trading/dealing, had on the 
Japanese capital market. It would be of use to first briefly give the background of this 
legislative change.  
 Japanese economy had flourished in the 1960s. After a recession in the 
1970s, it started growing rapidly again. To fund their growth, firms listed their shares 
on the stock market. In 1970, 1580 firms listed their stock on the Japanese stock 
exchanges, for a total market capitalization of 16.8 trillion yen. By 1980, 1729 firms 
listed their shares at a market capitalization of 80.0 trillion, and by 1987, 1912 listed 
shares worth 345,6 trillion.  
This rise of stock market had as a result that many scholars started to support 
the idea that without criminal and civil prosecution against insiders who committed 
insider trading/dealing, investors would not trust the stock market. To solve this, the 
Diet (Japanese Parliament) passed a statute. Under the new regime, if an officer or 
director bought or sold his firm's stock while holding material non-public 
information, he faced criminal penalties. If he bought or sold shares in a tender offer 
target, he faced criminal penalties. And if a tippee with that non-public information 
bought or sold stock, he faced the penalties too. It remains to check the impact it 
had to the Japanese stock market. 
 The market capitalization of Japanese firms grew from 71 trillion yen at the 
start of 1980 to 611 trillion by the close of 1989. Then, it collapsed. It has yet to 
                                                          
47 See Ramseyer J. Marc, Insider Trading Regulation in Japan, Harvard John M. Olin Center  
for  Law, Economics and Business, electronic copy available 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1915284 
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recover. Real estate prices plummeted at the same time. According to the author of 
this study, the fact that the collapse of the stock market began in 1989, the same 
year in which the insider trading ban was brought into effect is no coincidence. 
Consequently he supports that the Japanese economy case is a proof of the negative 
impact insider trading/dealing prohibition has on the capital market function.      
Ab. The opinion for the prohibition 
The first argument for the prohibition is given in a purely legal perspective 
and concerns the problem of duties to disclose information. More specifically, this 
means that as long as the insider is obliged to disclose specific information to his/her 
counterparty and he does not do so, the counterparty is protected because of the 
breach of this duty48. One example is given by U.S. Supreme Court ruling on Chiarella 
v. U.S. case49 which is briefly described below.  
The petitioner had been employed by a financial printer that had been 
engaged by certain corporations to print corporate takeover bids. Taking advantage 
of his position, he deduced the names of the target companies from information 
contained in documents delivered to the printer by the acquiring companies. 
Subsequently, without disclosing his knowledge, purchased stock in the target 
companies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover attempts were made 
public. According to the decision by having acted in this manner he had breached his 
duty to disclose this information to his counterparties. 
But the analysis of this argument can go a little deeper taking into account 
the American theory.   This has mainly to do with the so called fiduciary relationship 
requirement, according to which there is no insider trading/dealing violation as long 
as there is no such relationship prohibiting it50. In other words the insider will have 
to be bound by a specific fiduciary duty. For example in Dirks v. Securities and 
                                                          
48 See Lagenbucher Katja, The “use or possession” debate revisited -Spector Photo Group 
and Insider trading in Europe, p 464,   
49 See U.S. Supreme Court No 78-1202, 18.03.1980,445 U.S. 222 West Law Database 
50 See Sifuna Anazett Pacy, Disclose or abstain: The prohibition of insider trading on trial. 
Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 2012, p. 3-4 
28 
 
Exchange Commission51, the Supreme Court held that an insider was only liable if he 
made secret profits from trading in securities based on material confidential 
information  upon failure to disclose it.    
The second argument concerns causality issues and in particular hypothetical 
causality. According to it an insider’s defence based on the assumption that the 
counterparty would have been implicated anyway in this transaction and would have 
anyway suffered the same losses would be enough. A simple example is the 
following one52: if one drives his car over a bike and damages it could be admissible 
with the defence that the bike was old and rusty and would fall apart one day later 
anyway. The answer to this is that what makes the insider liable is not just his 
counterparty’s loss but the causal link between his action and his counterparty’s 
damage on the one hand and his intention to cause this damage to his counterparty 
on the other hand.  
An extra argument would be that the key point, is the time, at which, the 
damage takes place. At the time that the damage is caused, liability is born for the 
one who caused it and anything that could have happened afterwards, has no 
significant impact on liability issues53.         
As far as the Japanese economy example is concerned there are two arguments 
against the Ramseyer’s claims. The first one is based on a historical approach54 of the 
Japanese economy development according to which the stock exchange market 
transactions concerned only 10% of the population and there were no laws 
restricting their exploitation of price sensitive confidential information. After the 
introduction of laws they were consequently scared.   
                                                          
51 681 F.2d 824, 220 U.S. App. D.C. 309 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
52 See Lagenbucher p. 464 
53 See Stathopoulos Michalis, Obligation Law (General Part)I, 1982, p. 295, Kounougeri-
Manoledaki Efi, The problem of Hypothetical Causality in Compensation Law, Scientific 
Yearbook Armenopoulos, 1981 p. 18, Georgiades Asterios, Obligation Law (General Part) I, 
2003, p. 138-139 
54 See Sifuna Anazett Pacy, Disclose or abstain: The prohibition of insider trading on trial, p.8-
9 
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The second one is based on the fact that some scholars suggest that the crash of 
Japanese stock market should be attributed to a “bubble” in property assets and 
financial sectors of Japanese economy. It is also supported that the economy growth 
dropped from 4.4 % to 2.9 % in 1986 because of the yens appreciation55  
 
B. THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES 
The main underlying principles of the law of insider trading and market 
manipulation in capital markets, illustrated by EU legislation are the following ones: 
Ba. Investor/consumer protection 
The Investor/consumer protection is the principle which justifies between others 
the obligation for disclosure of material information, within the MAD. In its preamble 
recital 18, one comes across the notion of the normal and reasonable person, 
someone who is not in a privileged position to have access to privileged 
information56. This person has to be protected and the only manner to surely 
accomplish this, is to make sure that both parties have equal access to material 
information concerning their transaction. One manner to achieve that is through the 
disclosure duty. 
It is clear that this principle is also closely connected to the fairness argument. 
This, because it embodies this fundamental principle that each contracting party 
should be equal to the other and the one who is in an advantageous position vis-à-
vis the other ones should be prevented from profiting from an information the 
others are not aware of57.     
 
 Bb. Protection of competition/ fair market practices 
 This principle is found in Recital 25 of the Preamble of the MAD also aiming into 
creating the necessary confidence to the market which enhances its proper function 
                                                          
55  See Powell Benjamin, An Overview of Japan's Economy 1985–2000 available at 
http://mises.org/daily/1099, Sifuna Anazett Pacy, Disclose or abstain: The prohibition of 
insider trading on trial. Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 2012, p.9 
56Van Empel Martjin, Financial Services in Europe: An Introductory Overview, Austin, 
Boston, Chicago, New York, The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwers Law & Business,200  p. 125 
57 See ECJ C-45/08 Thought 48 
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and prosperity58 
Bc. Transparency 
This principle is fundamental. It can be found, in the preamble of the MAD in 
Recitals 26, 27 and must lead to avoiding preferential treatment and the distortion 
of competition. Reflecting the focus on transparency and market stability in Article 3, 
under Article 8, Member States are to ensure that a bid is made public in such a way 
as to ensure market transparency and integrity for the securities of the offeree and 
offeror companies, and of any other company affected by the bid, in order, in 
particular, to prevent the publication or dissemination of false or misleading 
information. This requirement should be read with the market manipulation and 
insider dealing prohibitions contained in the 2003 Market AbuseDirective159. 
Transparency is needed to ensure that prospective investors will all have equal 
access to material information concerning the issuer so that they can structure their 
investment strategy according to their financial needs and commit the essential 
capital in order to materialize their decisions60  
Bd. Market efficiency61  
All the measures and provisions concerning insider dealing and market 
manipulation are based on the principle of market efficiency. This means that 
legislators have to always take into account that capital markets have to work as 
efficiently as possible. In other words legislative provisions must not prevent them 
from doing so.  
It is obvious that this is one of the key principles because if a market does not 
function efficiently for its participants then it actually has no reason to exist, since 
they abandon it. It could be suggested that this market efficiency principle acts as 
the “opposite side” or the “limit” of principles like transparency and investor 
protection, in the sense that legislators should always be cautious not to smother 
                                                          
58Van Empel M. ibid 
59 See Papadopoulos Thomas/ Moloney Niamh, Law of the European Union, Oxford 
University Press, Issue 36, 2012, Section 20, EU Company Law, p.349  
60 See Staikouras Panagiotis, The Conundrum of the Market Abuse Directive Preventative 
Measures for EU Financial Services’ Intergration: In Search of Equilibrium between Market 
Integrity Enhancement and Undue Regulatory Encumbrance, p. 354 
61 See Barnes Paul, Stock market efficiency, insider dealing and market abuse  
, Publ. Gower, 2009 p. 123   
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market efficiency by trying to put into practice these doubtlessly vital principles. 
Its importance is clearly illustrated by the fact that the whole debate about 
whether insider dealing/trading prohibition is necessary or not, goes around this 
principle. Many scholars are trying to base their arguments on the positive or 
negative –depending on the argument- impact their opinion has on the market 
efficiency.          
Be. Integrity62 
Bf. Due skill care and diligence63 
Bg. Responsible and effective control of affairs with adequate risk-
management systems64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
62 See Van Empel M. ibid. 
63 See ibid 
64 See ibid 
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III. INSIDER DEALING ELEMENTS 
E. THE STRUCTURE OF THE OFFENCE 
The forms of insider trading/dealing are according to MAD the following ones:  
(a) dealing in (‘acquiring or disposing or attempting to acquire or dispose of’)  
financial instruments,  on the basis of inside information, by the persons listed in 
Article 2(1) (the so-called ‘primary insiders’), or any other person who possesses 
inside information,  if that person knows, or ought to have known, that it is inside 
information;  
(b) the disclosure of inside information by ‘primary insiders’ to third persons, 
unless such disclosure is made in the normal course of an individual’s employment or 
profession, and by the disclosure of inside information by ‘secondary insiders’;  and 
(c) a recommendation or inducement made by ‘primary insiders’ or by ‘secondary 
insiders’ to another person, on the basis of inside information, to deal in (‘acquire or 
dispose of’) financial instruments to which the information relates 
B.THE MEANING OF INSIDER 
The Directive distinguishes between primary and secondary insiders. Primary 
insiders are according to Article 2(2) (a) (c) MAD board members, directors and 
lawyers of a company. Furthermore, there is an extension of the old Insider Dealing 
Directive, according to which [Article 2 (2) (d) MAD] anyone who, by virtue of his 
criminal activities, possesses inside information is regarded as a primary insider. This 
is an explicit response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 as regards the 
fight against financing terrorist activities. 
According to Article 6 (3) MAD the issuers of financial instruments should provide 
a list of those persons working for them under a contract of employment or 
otherwise, who have access to inside information. This list should be upgraded 
regularly. Furthermore people exercising managerial responsibilities within an issuer 
or people closely associated to them must notify the competent authorities (e.g. FSA 
in UK, Capital Markets Commission in Greece etc) for their trading activity. 
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In ECJ 10.05.200765 the Court stated, that the need to ensure transparency in 
transactions conducted by persons discharging managerial responsibilities within 
issuers of securities and, where applicable, persons closely associated with them, did 
not appear, as such, in Directive 89/592, and that it was clear from recitals (15), (26) 
and (27) in the preamble to Directive 2003/6 that, as a measure aimed at preventing 
market abuse, the concept of transparency had been incorporated in the Community 
framework for the protection of markets in financial instruments in 2003 with the 
adoption of Directive 2003/6 which, on entering into force, repealed Directive 
89/592. 
Consequently, the answer to the question referred was that Articles 1 and 2 of 
Directive 89/592 had to be interpreted as meaning that, when the main shareholders 
and members of the board of directors of a company agreed to effect between 
themselves stock-market transactions in the transferable securities of that company 
in order to support artificially the price of those securities, they were in possession 
of inside information of which they did not take advantage with full knowledge of 
the facts when they carry out those transactions. 
   Secondary insiders are people who have been given inside information by an 
insider. A secondary insider can be any other person if this person knew or ought to 
have known that he or she possessed inside information66.  
C. THE INSIDE INFORMATION 
The first and main question which arises is what constitutes an inside 
information. It is obvious that this is a key question, since inside information plays a 
crucial role in the whole directive. According to Article 1(1) MAD, there are four 
                                                          
65  See C-391/04 Ipougrio Ikonomikon, Proistamenos DOI Amfissas,  v. Georgakis 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=61838&pageIndex=0&do
clang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1268650, Vervesos Nikolaos, 
Commentary on ECJ 10.05.2007, Business and Company Law 12/2007 
 
66  See Siems Mathias, The EU Market Abuse Directive: A Case-Based Analysis, p.7 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1066603 
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requirements which must be met, in order to characterize some information as 
“inside information”67. Specifically this information:  
• must be of a precise nature   
• must not have been made public  
• must relate, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of financial 
instruments or to one or more financial instruments  
• and, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the  
prices of those financial instruments or on the price of related derivative financial 
This is thought to be the ‘general definition’ of inside information68 . What now follows 
is a one by one approach of these characteristics. 
Ca. Precise nature 
Defining what kind of information constitutes information of a precise nature is a 
difficult task. The Directive on the Public Disclosure of Inside Information (Art 1 (2) 
2003/124/EC), provides the following definition of “precise information”: 
“[Information that] indicates a set of circumstances which exists or may reasonably 
be expected to come into existence or an event which has occurred or may 
reasonably be expected to do so [provided that] it is specific enough to enable a 
conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of that set of circumstances or event 
on the prices of financial instruments or related derivative financial instruments.”  
The precise nature of information is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis and 
depends on what the information is and the surrounding context. “Precise” is here 
                                                          
67  See also CESR, Second Set of Guidance, p.7, available at 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/06_562b.pdf, Kern Alexander INSIDER DEALING 
AND MARKET ABUSE: THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT 2000, p 12, 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP222.pdf. See also Siems Mathias, The EU Market Abuse 
Directive: A Case-Based Analysis, p.6 on “tipping” 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1066603 
 
68 See Avgouleas ibid p.15-17 about the two complementary definitions 
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used different in comparison with precise information concerning disclosure duties69 
since here it is interpreted more widely since it also involves information on “future 
facts”.  However, according to CESR70 in determining whether a set of circumstances 
exists or an event has occurred, it must always be seriously taken into account, 
whether there is solid and objective evidence for this as opposed to rumours or 
speculation e.g. if it can be proved to have happened or to exist.  
On the other hand, when the case is to consider on what may come into 
existence, the key point is whether it is reasonable to reach the conclusion that the 
specific event will take place/come into existence, based on the ex ante information 
available at the time.  
Relevant to this is up to a certain degree the ECJ  28.06.2012 decision71, 
according to which Article 1 of Directive 2003/6/EC and Article 1(1) of Commission 
Directive 2003/124/EC (Level 2 of Lamfalussy process) as regards the definition and 
public disclosure of inside information and the definition of market manipulation 
must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a protracted process intended to 
bring about a particular circumstance or to generate a particular event, not only may 
that future circumstance or future event be regarded as precise information within 
the meaning of those provisions, but also the intermediate steps of that process 
which are connected with bringing about that future circumstance or event72. 
There has also been some critique focused on the fact that ECJ did not take into 
consideration Article 2 of Commission Directive 2003/124/EC. The Court stated that 
                                                          
69 See Staikouras, The Conundrum of the Market Abuse Directive Preventative Measures for 
EU Financial Services’ Intergration: In Search of Equilibrium between Market Integrity 
Enhancement and Undue Regulatory Encumbrance 
70 CESR, Market Abuse Directive Level 3 – second set of CESR guidance and information on 
the common operation of the Directive to the market 
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71  See ECJ  28.06.2012, C-19/11, Markus Geltl v Daimler AG available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=124466&pageIndex=0&d
oclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=947079 
72 See Papadopoulos Thomas, Commentary on ECJ 28.06.2012, C-19/11, Hellenic Review of 
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a realistic prospect is something more than implausible73 and something less than a 
high probability74. This can cause implications, since it can lead to the legalization of 
insiders using price sensitive information, to which they have privileged access, as 
long as this information has a small probability to happen75.     
Furthermore according to the CESR’s guidance, information is ‘precise’ when it is 
based on true and objective (at the time it was obtained) information, even if it is 
subsequently proved to be inaccurate, as would be the case, for instance, when 
negotiations for a merger between two companies fail. Therefore, information based 
on rumours or speculation may not be ‘precise’, even if it, subsequently proves to be 
a successful forecast or estimate. The relevant piece of information may still be 
regarded as ‘precise’, even if it refers to more than one event and is only partially 
specific.  
As a result, a takeover bid could constitute inside information even though the 
bidder has not yet decided the offer price. In addition, a piece of information could 
be considered ‘precise’ even if it refers to events that could be alternatives, such as 
information that a takeover bid may be launched on one of two companies. Dealing 
in the securities of either company or encouraging or inducing such dealing, or 
disclosing relevant information would constitute insider dealing, even if the bid is 
finally launched only for one of them. 
Cb. Made Public 
The Market Abuse Directive does not contain exact guidance as to the meaning 
of non-public information. On the other hand, Article 6(1) of the Directive provides 
that issuers of financial instruments must make inside information that concerns 
them publicly available as soon as possible. In this way, the Market Abuse Directive 
imposes on issuers of financial instruments a duty of continuous disclosure of inside 
information. This duty is complied with, if information is disclosed in the manner 
prescribed in Article 2 of the Directive on the Definition of Public Disclosure of Inside 
                                                          
73 See Thought 48 
74 See Thoughts 46-47 
75 See Hansen, The Hammer and the Saw, p. 11 
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Information. At this point a reasonable question arises. Does this disclosure 
obligation include any information or is there information which can be kept 
confidential for competition reasons?  
Although the Directive is silent on this issue, it is generally presumed that there is 
certain information which can be excluded from this obligation scope. If there were 
no such limitation, the disclosure could harm the issuer since he/she would possibly 
have to disclose business knowledge, know-how and research results. One possible 
example is that such disclosure could prevent the granting of patents because an 
invention cannot be patented if previously made public7677. Furthermore it should be 
taken into consideration that some of the issuer’s competitors could possibly be 
non-listed companies, which therefore have no disclosure obligation and could in 
this manner just take advantage of the issuer’s disclosure obligation in order to learn 
his/her confidential vital business information. 
Based on the aforementioned arguments one more market-based approach is 
suggested78 concerning the relationship between Articles 2 and 6 MAD. According to 
it, a distinction between them must be made. The purpose of insider dealing/trading 
prohibition is the prevention of market abuse as long as the information remains 
“inside”. On the other hand, as the argument runs, the purpose of continuous 
disclosure obligation is to provide investors information about the financial situation 
of the issuer. As such information is considered mainly the disclosure of the issuer’s 
annual accounts. One extra historic argument for this opinion is that the US security 
regulation, first introduced in early 1930s, seems to have been strongly influenced 
                                                          
76 See Art. 3 (1) Directive 2003/124/EC in conjunction with CESR 2007 Guidance 2.8-2.9, 
Hansen The Hammer and the Saw, p.7-8, Staikouras Panagiotis, The Conundrum of the 
Market Abuse Directive Preventative Measures for EU Financial Services’ Intergration: In 
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77 See also interesting critique on delay of disclosure, concerning possibility of abuse in two 
tier Board structure issuers , Staikouras Panagiotis ibid p. 359  
78 See Hansen The Hammer and the Saw, p.7-8 
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by UK company law on accounting79. Article 2 concerns the short term investors, 
while Article 6 the long term ones.          
By implication, inside information disclosed in this manner is regarded as having 
entered the public domain and no longer qualifies as ‘non-public’. However, 
information that is of a precise nature, directly or indirectly refers to relevant 
financial instruments or their issuers, and is price sensitive may have various sources 
other than the issuer—for instance, information relating to the advanced 
preparations of another company to launch a takeover bid for the issuer. Thus, 
Article 6(1) of the Market Abuse Directive and attendant Implementing Measures 
provide an incomplete definition of information that is ‘non-public’. Very plausibly, 
research and estimates developed from publicly available data should not be 
regarded as inside information. As a result, transactions carried out on the basis of 
information contained in such research or estimates, do not constitute insider 
dealing within the meaning of the Directive80.  
As far as the question at which time point some information is made public, is 
concerned, the answer is to be found initially by checking whether listed companies 
have used the disclosure mechanisms specified by their Competent Authority, in 
order to disclose the inside information. So, for example, if they are required to 
make information publicly available through a particular electronic news service, it 
will not necessarily be sufficient for them only to give the information to a 
newspaper. However, for the purposes of determining whether a transaction was 
made using inside information, it should be noted that it is enough that the 
information has been made public. Public in this sense, means that a considerable 
number of people interested can have access to it. Possible examples of such 
disclosure are e.g. disclosure of the inside information through social medias, TV 
Channels etc. This distinction can also support the argument about the distinction 
between the function of Article 2 MAD and Article 6 MAD, analyzed above.  
                                                          
79 See Hansen ibid p. 7 
80 See Avgouleas ibid p. 17 
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Cc. Directly or indirectly related to one or more issuers of financial instruments 
or to one or more financial instruments  
It is clear that there are two categories of information provided here. The first 
one has to do with information which directly concerns the issuer, the second one 
with information which indirectly concerns the issuer.   
Information which directly concerns the issuer are e.g.81 Operating business 
performance; Changes in control and control agreements; Changes in management 
and supervisory boards; Changes in auditors or any other information related to the 
auditors' activity; Operations involving the capital or the issue of debt securities or 
warrants to buy or subscribe securities; Decisions to increase or decrease the share 
capital; 
Information which indirectly concerns the issuer are e.g Data and statistics 
published by public institutions disseminating statistics; The coming publication of 
rating agencies’ reports; The coming publication of research, recommendations or 
suggestions concerning the value of listed financial instruments;  Central bank 
decisions concerning interest rates; Government’s decisions concerning taxation, 
industry regulation, debt management, etc.; Decisions concerning changes in the 
governance rules of market indices, and especially as regards their composition; 
Regulated and unregulated markets’ decisions concerning rules governing the 
markets; 
An example82: A civil case of insider dealing was brought against two traders 
at Dresdner Kleinwort. They managed a portfolio that held $65m of a Barclays 
floating rate note (FRN) issue. In March 2007, they were given inside information 
about a possible new issue of Barclays FRNs on more favorable terms and 
immediately offloaded their existing holding to other investors who were unaware of 
the Barclays proposal. That afternoon, the new issue was announced, and the 
purchasers made losses of $66,000. The traders argued that, in the debt markets 
                                                          
81 All of them p. 7 http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/06_562b.pdf 
82 See http://www.out-law.com/page-8305 (citation) 
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they dealt in, what they had done was acceptable practice. They escaped with a 
censure and no fine – in recognition, perhaps, that there was some basis for their 
claim. 
Cd. Significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price 
of related derivative financial 
Article 1 of Commission Directive 2003/124/EC amplifies what is meant by the 
concept of “information likely to have a significant price effect”. According to it, 
"…information which, if it were to be made public, would be likely to have a 
significant effect on the prices of financial instruments or related derivative financial 
instruments shall mean information a reasonable investor would be likely to use as 
part of the basis of his investment decisions." So the criterion set is whether it is 
possible that this information could lead a reasonable investor, to certain investment 
decisions.  
A question which arises is whether the disclosure of inside information must 
have indeed influenced the price of the financial instrument or it is sufficient that it 
could have influenced it. ECJ recently noted that the key element to decide on 
whether some information is inside or not is the capacity of this information to have 
a significant effect on the price of instruments to which it relates and not whether its 
disclosure actually had a significant effect on the price of the financial instruments to 
which it relates83 .  
The fact that an event does not appear on the list does not mean it cannot be 
inside information. Nor does the fact that an event is included on the list mean that 
it automatically will be inside information: the materiality of the event needs to be 
considered. Something would only constitute inside information if it was sufficiently 
material. Moreover, as noted above, it is the specific circumstances of each case 
which need to be considered.  
                                                          
83  See Court of Justice of the European Union PRESS RELEASE No 113/09 
p.2http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2009-12/cp090113en.pdf and 
ECJ 23.12.2009, C 45/08, Spector Photo Group NV Chris Van Raemdonck v. Commissie Voot 
her Bank-, Finanzie-en Assurantiewezen (68-69), available at the official EU website,  
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=77184&pageIndex=0&do
clang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=664283  
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D. SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT 
Da. The distinction between primary and secondary insiders 
The final point which must be examined is whether the judge must also check 
whether specific subjective requirements are met (knowledge, intention etc). In 
order to answer this question, a distinction between primary insider and secondary 
insider84, set in Directive 2003/6/EC, art 2(2)(a),(c) must be taken into account. As far 
as primary insiders (directors, shareholders, COEs, company lawyers etc) are 
concerned, it is sufficient that they were aware of the information85.  
On the other hand, as far as secondary insiders are concerned, one extra subject 
requirement must be met. They must also know that this information is inside 
information. This is different from US law where it is always required that a fiduciary 
relationship must be breached86. This may be quite difficult to establish.   
Furthermore, for most remedies some kind of fault is necessary for primary 
insiders. In many cases, therefore, it does not matter whether someone is a primary 
or a secondary insider. This is different from US law where there always has to be a 
breach of a fiduciary relationship, which may be difficult to establish. 
 
Db.  The” Spector case”  
In ECJ “Spector” decision, it has been made clear that Directive 2003/6 defines 
insider dealing objectively87. More specifically the preliminary question set before 
the Court, concerned the interpretation of Article 2 (1) “use of inside information”. 
The Court’s answer was that the Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/6 does not stipulate 
that prohibited transactions must be carried out ‘with full knowledge of the facts’ 
                                                          
84 See Kern Alexander INSIDER DEALING AND MARKET ABUSE: THE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AND MARKETS ACT 2000 p.13, http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP222.pdf 
85 See Siems Mathias, The EU Market Abuse Directive: A Case-Based Analysis, p.7 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1066603 
86 See Siems Mathias supra note p. 7  
87 Court of Justice of the European Union PRESS RELEASE No 113/09 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2009-12/cp090113en.pdf, ECJ 
23.12.2009, C 45/08, Spector Photo Group NV, Chris Van Raemdonck v. Commissie Voot her 
Bank-, Finanzie-en Assurantiewezen (31-38) available at official EU website,  
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=77184&pageIndex=0&do
clang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=664283 
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but merely prohibits primary insiders from using inside information when entering 
into market transactions. That article, according to the decision, defines the 
constituent elements of such prohibited transactions by referring expressly to two 
such elements, namely, the persons likely to fall within its scope and the material 
actions which constitute that transaction88. In other words what is to be proved is 
first that the trader is a primary insider and second that he possessed some specific 
inside information.   
Its reasoning is in particular based on the following two arguments. The first 
one 89  is the so called “profession based argument” 90 , according to which a 
professional intermediary is typically familiar with trading prohibitions and can 
therefore be expected to be especially sensitive monitoring relevant sales. The 
second one is the efficiency of prosecution argument91 according to which the 
effectiveness of prosecution will be harmed if the proof of subjective element will be 
required.    
 It is quite clear that there is no explicit reference to intention in this 
definition. The purpose of this was to establish an effective and uniform system for 
sanctioning insider dealing with the legitimate aim of protecting the integrity of 
financial markets. 
Dc. Critique 
There is some interesting critique going on, concerning this point92. More 
specifically the central point of this critique, regards whether “use” can establish a 
state of mind. The requirements set in Article 2 MAD are a)the trader qualifying as a 
primary insider in possession of inside information and b) the execution of a 
transaction and c) the use of this information for this transaction. It is supported that 
all these three aforementioned requirements constitute objective elements of the 
offence. On the other hand as the argument runs, there is no reference to the 
subjective element meaning state of mind. This should regard whether the primary 
                                                          
88 See Thought 31 
89 See Thought 36 
90 See Lagenbucher Katja p. 457 
91 See Langenbucher Katja ibid. 
92 See thoroughly Langenbucher Katja, p. 459 
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insider knew or should have known that the information he possessed had been 
“inside” information and furthermore it could also regard whether he intentionally 
or just negligently used it in a relevant transaction. 
As it has already been mentioned the Court ruled that the possession of the 
inside information and the transaction are enough. In this manner it is clear that a 
presumption of guilt is established. The first question, which arises, is whether this 
violates Article 6 (2) ECHR which guarantees everyone charged with a criminal 
offence a presumption of innocence. The ECJ refers to the ECHR’S premise that 
factual or legal presumptions are not prohibited in principle93. As long as the 
presumption is rebuttable and the rights of the defence are not infringed, Directive is 
in conformity with ECHR.   
The second question which arises is in which manner this presumption can be 
rebutted. It is a reasonable question since it is not easy to think of an example, in 
which a primary insider, who possessed inside information and executed a relative 
transaction could prove he had not known either that the information was “inside” 
information or that it had been related to the specific transaction he executed. 
Perhaps an –unlikely- example would be the following one. If the date, on which he 
acquired the information, were certain and there were also certain evidence (e.g. 
documents) proving that he had taken the decision to execute this transaction 
before acquiring the information, then he would possibly avoid conviction. 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
93 See Salabiaku v. France ECHR, 07.10.1988, concerning presumption available at website  
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/projects/car_serbia/ECt
HR%20Judgements/English/SALABIAKU%20v%20FRANCE%20-
%20ECHR%20Judgment%20_English_.pdf 
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IV. MARKET MANIPULATION 
A. DEFINITION 
Market manipulation is generally admitted as a very difficult concept to 
define.  Legal prohibitions of this practice (offence), such as those in the US Page 
Securities Exchange Act 1934 (SEA 1934), and the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) 
have failed to provide a comprehensive definition of market manipulation, although 
the most celebrated Treatise on US Securities Regulation suggests that the main 
purpose of the Federal Statutes was ‘to give a greater degree of definiteness to the 
concept of manipulation’ along with supplying an enforcement and preventive 
mechanism. For this reason instead of a definition one mainly finds descriptions of 
certain practices94.  
Aa. The Market Abuse Directive Definition 
 
The Market Abuse Directive defines market manipulation as meaning: 
  a. Transactions or orders to trade:- - which give, or are likely to give, false  
and misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for or price of financial 
instruments [for ease of reference this might be termed "false or misleading 
transactions"]; or - which secure by a person or persons acting in collaboration, the 
price of one or several financial instruments at an abnormal or artificial level ["price 
positioning"] unless the transaction/order to trade had a legitimate reason and 
conforms to accepted market practices on the regulated market concerned.  
b. Transactions or orders to trade which employ fictitious devices or any 
other form of deception or contrivance ["fictitious devices"].  
c. Dissemination of information through the media... which gives or is likely 
to give false and misleading signals as to financial instruments ... where the person 
who made the dissemination knew, or ought to have known, that the information 
was false or misleading... ["false or misleading information"]  
 
                                                          
94 For a thorough analysis of the definitions which have been suggested until today see 
Avgouleas Emilios, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse, Oxford University Press, 
2005, Chapter 4 p.2-12 
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Ab. The Market Abuse Regulation Definition  
Article 895 of the Market Abuse Regulation provides the definition of market 
manipulation. In particular, it is provided that for the purposes of the Regulation 
market manipulation shall also comprise the following activity:  
“d) transmitting false or misleading information or providing false or 
misleading inputs where the person who made the transmission or provided the 
input knew or ought to have known that it was false or misleading, or any other 
behaviour which manipulates the calculation of a benchmark.” This is a clear 
reference to the LIBOR scandal.  
Ac. One more general definition 
One definition suggested is the following one96: “Behaviour effected through 
any one, or a combination of any of the following: misrepresentations and other 
false statements or concealments, artificial transactions, and trading schemes, which 
are made or structured in such a way as to induce market participants to engage in 
the trading of financial investments or the exercise of rights in financial investments. 
Relevant trading must be in such a direction or the exercise of rights must be 
effected in such a way, as to either lead the price of these investments to an artificial 
level, and/or enable the perpetrators of the behaviour to materialize, from interests 
held in the specific or related investments, financial gains that would not be possible, 
in the absence of such behavior”. 
Analyzing this definition it is clear that it includes five objective and two 
subjective elements.   
The objective ones are: 
(a) the nature of the actions (conduct) that the behaviour in question consists 
of, for instance, misrepresentations or artificial transactions; 
                                                          
95 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/131023_esma-
mandate_en.pdf 
96 See Avgouleas Emilios, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse, Oxford 
University Press, 2005, Chapter 4 p.12-13 
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(b) the direction of market participants’ trades, or the way in which they 
exercise their rights in financial investments, following the occurrence of the 
behaviour in question once this becomes visible to market participants; 
(c) the gains that alleged manipulators obtained from their positions in the 
specific or related financial investments; 
(d) whether these gains would be possible, in the absence of the relevant 
behaviour; and 
(e) the structure of the manipulative scheme in question. 
The subjective elements of the definition are: first, inducement, and 
secondly, the alleged manipulator’s intent. 
Ad. The ECJ 22.03.2012 decision 
The preliminary question set to ECJ from the Curtea de Apel Cluj (Romania) 
concerned whether the provisions of Article 47 of [Directive 2004/39] had to be 
interpreted as meaning that a market which has not been notified by a competent 
national authority and is not included in the list of regulated markets is not subject 
to the legal rules applicable to the regulated markets, in particular as regards the 
rules designed to prevent market abuse under Directive 2003/6/EC. 
The answer was that in accordance with Article 9 (1) MAD applies to any 
financial instrument admitted to trading on a regulated market in at least one 
Member State or for which a request for admission to trading on such a market has 
been made, irrespective of whether or not the transaction itself actually takes place 
on that market. The referring court, as the decision runs, merely stated that the 
transactions of which the defendants in the main proceedings had been accused 
were made on the Rasdaq market. It did not indicate whether the shares concerned 
were also admitted for trading on another market in financial instruments which was 
classified as a regulated market or whether the request for such admission had been 
submitted at the material time. If that had been the case, which would have been for 
the national court to establish, that manipulation would in any event fall within the 
scope of Directive 2003/6 by virtue of Article 9 thereof and it would not be necessary 
to know, for the purpose of the dispute in the main proceedings, whether or not the 
Rasdaq market is a regulated market within the meaning of Directive 2004/39. 
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B. PRACTICES CONSIDERED TO BE MARKET MANIPULATION 
CESR provided in its first set of guidance a group of practices which its 
members consider to be market manipulation. These practices are described below: 
Ba. False/Misleading Transactions Examples 
i. Wash trades97 
 This is the practice of entering into arrangements for the sale or purchase of 
a financial instrument where there is no change in beneficial interests or market risk 
or where the transfer of beneficial interest or market risk is only between parties 
who are acting in concert or collusion. (Repo transactions and stock 
lending/borrowing or other transactions involving transfer of securities as collateral 
do not constitute wash trades. 
ii. Painting the tape98 
This practice involves engaging in a transaction or series of transactions 
which are shown on a public display facility to give the impression of activity or price 
movement in a financial instrument.  
iii.  Improper matched orders99; 
 These are transactions where both buy and sell orders are entered at or nearly at 
the same time, with the same price and quantity by different but colluding parties, 
unless the transactions are legitimate trades carried out in conformity with the rules 
of the releva nt trading platform (e.g. crossing trades).  
iv.  Placing orders with no intention of executing them100 
                                                          
97 See CESR, Level 3 – first set of CESR guidance and information on the common 
operation of the Directive http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/04_505b.pdf 
98 See CESR, Level 3 – first set of CESR guidance and information on the common 
operation of the Directive http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/04_505b.pdf 
99 See CESR, Level 3 – first set of CESR guidance and information on the common operation 
of the Directive http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/04_505b.pdf 
100 See CESR, Level 3 – first set of CESR guidance and information on the common operation 
of the Directive http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/04_505b.pdf 
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This involves the entering of orders, especially into electronic trading systems, 
which are higher/lower than the previous bid/offer. The intention is not to execute 
the order but to give a misleading impression that there is demand for or supply of 
the financial instrument at that price. The orders are then withdrawn from the 
market before they are executed. (A variant on this type of market manipulation is 
to place a small order to move the bid/offer price of the financial instrument and 
being prepared for that order to be executed if it cannot be withdrawn in time. 
Bb. Price Positioning 
i. Marking the close101.  
This practice involves deliberately buying or selling securities or derivatives contracts 
at the close of the market in an effort to alter the closing price of the security or 
derivatives contract. This practice may take place on any individual trading day but is 
particularly associated with dates such as future/option expiry dates or 
quarterly/annual portfolio or index reference/valuation points. Other ones are 
Abusive squeeze, Excessive bid-ask spreads, etc. 
ii. Colluding in the after market of an Initial Public Offer.  
This practice is particularly associated with Initial Public Offers of securities 
immediately after trading in the security begins. Parties which have been allocated 
stock in the primary offering collude to purchase further tranches of stock when 
trading begins in order to force the price of the security to an artificial level and 
generate interest from other investors – at which point they sell their holdings.  
iii.  Abusive squeeze 
 This involves a party or parties with a significant influence over the supply of, or 
demand for, or delivery mechanisms for a financial instrument and/or the underlying 
product of a derivative contract exploiting a dominant position in order materially to 
distort the price at which others have to deliver, take delivery or defer delivery of 
the instrument/product in order to satisfy their obligations.   
iv.  Creation of a floor in the price pattern 
                                                          
101 See CESR, Level 3 – first set of CESR guidance and information on the common operation 
of the Directive http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/04_505b.pdf  
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This practice is usually carried out by issuers or other entities which control them, 
and involves transactions or orders to trade employed in such a way that obstacles 
are created to the share prices falling below a certain level, mainly in order to avoid 
negative consequences for their share or credit ratings. This needs to be 
distinguished from legitimate trading in shares as part of "buy-back" programmes or 
the stabilisation of financial instruments.  
v.  Excessive bid-ask spreads 
This conduct is carried out by intermediaries which have market power – such as 
specialists or market makers acting in cooperation – in such a way intentionally to 
move the bid-ask spread to  and/or to maintain it at artificial levels and far from fair 
values, by abusing of their market power, i.e. the absence of other competitors.  
vi. Trading on one market to improperly position the price of a financial 
instrument on a related market 
This practice involves undertaking trading in one market with a view to 
improperly influencing the price of the same or a related financial instrument in 
another market. Examples might be conducting trades in an equity to position the 
price of its derivative traded on another market at a distorted level or trading in the 
underlying product of a commodity derivative to distort the price of the derivative 
contract. On the other hand, transactions to take legitimate advantage of differences 
in the prices of financial instruments or underlying products as traded in different 
locations would not constitute manipulation.  
Bc. Transactions involving fictitious devices/deception 
Trash and cash his is the opposite of pump and dump. A party will take a 
short position in a security; undertake further selling activity and/or spread 
misleading negative information about the security with the purpose of driving down 
its price. The manipulator then closes their position after the price has fallen102. 
i. Concealing ownership 
  This is a transaction or series of transactions which is designed to conceal the 
ownership of a financial instrument via the breach of disclosure requirements 
                                                          
102 CESR, Level 3 – first set of CESR guidance and information on the common operation of 
the Directive http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/04_505b.pdf 
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through the holding of the instrument in the name of a colluding party (or parties). 
The disclosures are misleading in respect of the true underlying holding of the 
instrument. (This practice does not cover cases where there are legitimate reasons 
for financial instruments to be held in the name of a party other than the beneficial 
owner – e.g. nominee holdings. Nor do all failures to make a required disclosure 
necessarily constitute market manipulation.)  
ii. Dissemination of false or misleading market information through media, 
including the internet, or by any other means (in some jurisdictions this is 
known as 'scalping'103) 
This is done with the intention of moving the price of a security, a derivative 
contract or the underlying asset in a direction that is favourable to the position held 
or a transaction planned by the person disseminating the information 
 
iii. Pump and dump 
This practice involves taking a long position in a security and then 
undertaking further buying activity and/or disseminating misleading positive 
information about the security with a view to increasing the price of the security. 
Other market participants are misled by the resulting effect on price and are 
attracted into purchasing the security. The manipulator then sells out at the inflated 
price.  
iv.  'Trash and cash' 
This is the opposite of pump and dump. A party will take a short position in a 
security; undertake further selling activity and/or spread misleading negative 
information about the security with the purpose of driving down its price. The 
manipulator then closes their position after the price has fallen.  
v.  Opening a position and closing it immediately after its public disclosure 
This practice is typically carried out by portfolio managers and other large 
investors whose investment decisions are usually valued by market participants as 
                                                          
103 See also LG Frankfurt 9.11.1999, AG 2000 p.187, Tountopoulos Vasilios, Scalping as 
insider trading according to Presidential Decree 53/1992, Commentary on Prior decision of 
LG Frankfurt,  Business and Company Law 12/2000, p. 1206 
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relevant signals of future price dynamics. The canonical unfair conduct consists in 
closing the position previously acquired immediately after having publicly disclosed it 
putting emphasis on the long holding period of the investment. However, making a 
report or disclosure will not, in itself, give rise to a false or misleading impression if it 
was made in the way specified by any applicable legal or regulatory requirement and 
was expressly required or permitted by such a requirement.  
Bd. Dissemination of false and misleading information104 
v. Spreading false/misleading information through the media105 
This involves behavior such as posting information on an internet bulletin board 
or issuing a press release which contains false or misleading statements about a 
company whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market. The person 
spreading the information knows that it is false or misleading and is disseminating 
the information in order to create a false or misleading impression.  
vi.  Other behaviour designed to spread false/misleading information  
This type of market manipulation would cover a course of conduct designed to 
give false and misleading impression through means other than the media. An 
example might be the movement of physical commodity stocks to create a 
misleading impression as to the supply or demand for a commodity or the 
deliverable into a commodity futures contract.  
vii. An Example 
Example: In early 2004, Shell announced that it was writing down 25 per cent 
of its hydrocarbon reserves, causing a £2.9bn drop in its market capitalization. The 
FSA found that the company had not only disseminated information likely to give a 
false or misleading impression in relation to its reserves since 1998 but also failed to 
act when evidence of irregularities first came to light. Executives had been aware of 
the problems at least four years previously. Nonetheless, the FSA’s fine appeared 
                                                          
104 See Supreme Court of the USA 18.06.2009, F.Scott Yeager v. USA, LexisNexis Academic 
105 See CESR, Level 3 – first set of CESR guidance and information on the common operation 
of the Directive http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/04_505b.pdf 
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puny compared with the $120m (£66m) settlement agreed with the SEC, its US 
equivalent. Having ruled against Shell, the FSA continued its enquiries into the 
conduct of a number of individuals in the senior management at the company, most 
notably the former chairman, Sir Philip Watts. But in November 2005 it announced 
that no further action would be taken. The company may have been at fault, but no 
one individual was found to have committed market abuse. 
viii. ECJ Jurisprudence on Dissemination of false and misleading information 
According to ECJ 07.07.2011, Article 1(2)(a), second indent, of 
Directive 2003/6/EC on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) 
must be interpreted as not requiring, in order for the price of one or more financial 
instruments to be considered to have been fixed at an abnormal or artificial level, 
that that price must maintain an abnormal or artificial level for more than a certain 
duration106. This means that there is no minimum time limit necessary concerning 
the maintenance of the price, for the establishment of market manipulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
106 See ECJ 07.07.2011,C-445/09,  IMC Securities BV v. Stichtig Autoriteit Financiële Markten 
Ruling+(28),http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0445:EN:
HTML 
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V. ENFORCEMENT AND SAFE HARBORS 
A.ENFORCEMENT 
This last part concerns enforcement measures against market abuse (both 
insider dealing and market manipulation). Market abuse may be enforced in four 
different ways.  
First, administrative enforcement is the main type of enforcement addressed 
in the Market Abuse Directive. For instance, the Directive states that the competent 
authorities of the Member States must have the powers to access documents, to 
demand information, to carry out on-site inspections, to request telephone records, 
to suspend trading and to freeze assets. When provisions of the Directive have not 
been complied with, Member States shall ensure that there are effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive administrative sanctions. Further, the Directive 
specifies that there should be a single administrative authority in each Member State 
and that the members of the authority shall enjoy professional secrecy..125 An 
appeal against the decisions of the competent authority shall be possible, and 
authorities of different Member States shall cooperate. 
 
Second, insider dealing and market manipulation often lead to criminal 
sanctions. However, the Directive restricts itself to the words “without prejudice to 
the right of Member States to impose criminal sanctions…”. Thus, with respect to 
criminal sanctions, several aspects remain within the discretion of the Member 
States, such as: whether they provide sanctions at all; whether they link such 
sanctions to the definitions of market abuse of EU law (very likely – despite 
differences in burden of proof); which kind of subjective requirements are imposed 
(always intent?); and which kinds of criminal punishment can follow. 
Third, the recitals of the EU Directive recommend internal control 
mechanisms, namely “grey lists”, “window trading”, “codes of conduct” and 
“Chinese walls”. A company draws up a “grey list” of its business partners in order to 
communicate to its employees with whose securities they should not trade.“Chinese 
walls” are information barriers in order to ensure that the department of a company 
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(typically a financial institution) which trades in financial instruments does not get 
access to information available in other departments.  
Fourth, private-law claims are not addressed in MAD. In cases of market 
manipulation, in particular securities fraud, private enforcement can be important. 
Here many questions have to answered such as whether the basis of a private claim 
is securities law or tort law, whether it is directed against the company or the 
managers, whether causality has to be proven, whether negligence or intent are 
necessary, whether it leads to disgorgement of profits, rescission, or damages and 
how damages are calculated. These topics, still depend on national law in Europe107. 
 
B.SAFE HARBORS REGARDING INSIDER DEALING 
In this unit certain occasions which provide a defence or a “safe harbor” to 
people, who may have access to inside information due to other reasons.   
Ba. Trading in own shares 
  Under Article 8 and Recital 33 of the Market Abuse Directive, trading in own 
shares in the context of buy-back programmes and the stabilization of financial 
instruments is exempted from the prohibitions of the Directive if it complies with the 
requirements of the Regulation on share-buy backs and stabilizations.  
Bb. Obligations Arisen before the possession of the information 
Furthermore, Article 2(3) of the Directive creates a safe harbor from the 
prohibition for transactions conducted in the discharge of an obligation to acquire or 
dispose of financial instruments, provided that the relevant obligation has arisen in 
the context of an agreement that was concluded before the person concerned 
possessed inside information and the parties’ obligations have become due.  The 
goal if this safe harbor is clear since it protects the certainty of contracts and allows 
for the proper performance of pre-existing contractual obligations, which, in the 
absence of the safe harbor could also be exposed to the threat of voidability108. 
Bc. Market Makers  
                                                          
107 See Avgouleas, ibid with reference to different legal orders France, Greece etc, Siems 
Mathias p. 27 
108 See Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation Chapter 6 p. 22 
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According to Recital 18, market makers, bodies authorized to act as 
counterparties (e.g. exchanges in exchange Markets), or settlement and payment 
systems, custodians, and persons authorized to execute orders on behalf of third 
parties who possess inside information, will not be found in violation of the 
prohibition provided that: (a) market makers and central counterparties or 
settlement and payment systems restrict themselves to buying or selling financial 
instruments, and (b) brokers who act for third parties simply carryout ‘an order 
dutifully’; as these persons are afforded a safe harbor their trading activities will not 
be deemed in themselves to constitute use of such ‘inside information’. 
Bd. Access due to a Takeover bid 
Recital 29 provides that the mere fact of having access to inside information 
relating to another company and using it in the context of a public takeover bid, for 
the purpose of gaining control of that company or proposing a merger with that 
company, should not in itself be deemed to constitute insider dealing. This safe 
harbor in conjunction with the safe harbor of Recital 30 clearly covers trading by a 
bidder in a prospective target company’s securities in its full knowledge that it is 
preparing to launch a takeover bid for that company. However, any bidder acting in 
the way described above in the preparation of a takeover bid must also comply with 
Article 6 of the Takeover Bids Directive. This Article requires that a bidder discloses 
without delay its decision to make a bid, and even pre-notifies the supervisory 
authority of its decision, 117 also being obliged to draw up, in a timely fashion, an 
offer document addressed to the shareholders of the offeree company. 
Be. Disclosure in the normal course of the exercise of his employment, 
profession or duties 
Furthermore, Article 3(a) of the Market Abuse Directive creates a clear safe 
harbor from the secondary offence of disclosure of inside information, where such 
disclosure is made by a person ‘in the normal course of the exercise of his 
employment, profession or duties’. Within the safe harbor should fall directors who 
discuss the unpublished results of an issuer with their auditors and bankers, the 
regulatory and tax authorities, and the company’s lawyers or accountants who share 
‘inside information’ with their co-workers for the purposes of work carried out for 
the issuer. 
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C. SAFE HARBORS FOR MARKET MANIPULATION 
Article 8 and Recital 33 of the Market Abuse Directive provide that trading in 
own shares in the context of buy-back programmes and the stabilization of financial 
instruments are exempted from the prohibitions of the Directive as long as they are 
carried out in accordance with the requirements of the EC Regulation on share buy-
backs and stabilizations. The choice of enacting a Regulation indicates that the 
Commission aimed at the maximum harmonization of Member State’s regulations 
on share buy-backs and stabilizations. Furthermore, through the use of a Regulation 
greater legal certainty concerning the implementation and application of the 
relevant rules is achieved.  
This does not, however, mean that share buy-back schemes and 
stabilizations109 that do not comply with the provisions of the Regulation should be 
deemed to constitute market abuse110. They should be examined by the Member 
States’ competent authorities on an ad hoc basis for the purposes of enforcing the 
prohibition of market manipulation in the Directive and requisite sanctions should 
apply111.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
109 For extensive analysis see Avgouleas Chapter 6 p. 43-51 
110 See Avgouleas Chapter 6 p.43 
111 See ibid with reference to different legal orders France, Greece etc. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The notion of insider dealing and market manipulation has been analyzed 
above. This analysis included the description of their elements, their practices, their 
impact on the market and the possible safe harbors. Their importance as key factors 
of the function of capital markets has been –hopefully- made clear. 
It has also been made clear that in capital markets huge numbers of 
transactions, which involve large sums of money, take place worldwide on a daily 
basis. Large sums of money mean powerful interests. Powerful interests mean 
capability to finance research. For this reason, the evolution of securities markets is 
very rapid and continuously involves new technologies and new financial 
instruments. Consequently the legislators have difficulty in following this evolution. 
A possible danger is that regulatory authorities cannot understand the mechanics of 
what they have to regulate and sanctioning authorities the practices they have to 
sanction. 
 Hopefully the new Regulation on Market Abuse and the new Directive on 
sanctioning manipulation of benchmarks will effectively deal with these emerging 
dangers.        
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